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14 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT : Background Material for Arms Control
Discussions with Mr. Smith and Gen. Davis

1. ACDA originally proposed six options for U.S. positions in the strategic arms talks. This is appended as attachment 1. The NSSM-28 group has considered only options I through IV of ACDA's list and revised them slightly. This is appended as attachment 2.

2. ACDA farmed out [] the task of commenting on options III, IV and V except that they chose to identify them [] as options A, B and C, respectively. [] commented on A, B and C but volunteered an option of his own which he labeled D. This is appended as attachment 3. If you believe this is rather confusing, don't worry, it gets worse.

3. In addition to the above, there is SWWA or "Stop Where We Are". This has not been considered by the NSSM-28 group but is an idea of Mr. Smith's and says in effect, "Stop building any more missile sites, stop testing any more missiles." There happens to be a lot in common between SWWA and [] Option D, and it is my understanding that Mr. Smith and General Davis wish to discuss this with you on Friday.

4. The key features of Option D are that construction of fixed facilities for launching ballistic missiles of any range whatever be prohibited; that mobile facilities for launching ballistic missiles greater than 1,000 km range be prohibited; and, construction of ABM radars be prohibited as well as ABM launch facilities. Further, flight


STATE review(s) completed. NRO REVIEW COMPLETED

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tests of missiles having power flight at an altitude greater than 50 km be prohibited except for pre-announced launchings of a specified number of confidence test firings of operational missiles.

5. Tabulated below are the key provisions of options I through VI:

Basic Option I. Freeze of Numbers of Land-Based
Offensive Missile Launchers

In this option, the U.S. would propose a "freeze" of the number of fixed land-based strategic offensive missile launchers, with no constraints on sea-based missiles. Mobile land-based strategic offensive missiles would be completely banned. There would be no restrictions on MIRV's, on any other improvements of ICBM's, or on ABM characteristics.

Basic Option II. Freeze of Numbers of Offensive
Missile Launchers

In this option, the U.S. would propose a "freeze" of the numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers, respectively. There would be no restrictions on MIRV's, on any other improvements of ICBM's, or on ABM characteristics. Mobile ICBM's would be permitted within the total allowed number of ICBM's.


Basic Option III. Freeze of Numbers and Certain Types
of Offensive Missile Launchers with
MIRV's Allowed

In this option, the U.S. would propose a "freeze" of the numbers of land-based and sea-based strategic offensive missile launchers, respectively, as well as certain limited qualitative restrictions, and a ban on mobile missiles. MIRV testing and deployment would be allowed.

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Basic Option IV. Freeze of Numbers and Certain Types
of Offensive Missile Launchers with
MIRV's Prohibited

This option is identical to Basic Option II, except that the U.S. would also propose that multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's) and certain types of flight tests be prohibited.

Basic Option V. Quantitative and Qualitative Freeze
on Strategic Forces

In addition to the restrictions listed in Options III and IV, changing or improving the characteristics of deployed strategic missiles and missile launchers would be prohibited, except for minor internal changes in deployed missiles, such as those designed to improve missile reliability or RV hardening. These permitted internal changes would exclude those involving range, throw-weight, and external missile and RV characteristics.


All strategic offensive missile flight tests would be prohibited, except for an agreed number of pre-announced confidence and crew training firings of presently deployed types of strategic missiles on agreed ranges. However, the development, flight-testing (within the agreed number of confidence-firings), and deployment of exoatmospheric pen-aids (other than MIRV's, MRV's, or decoys capable of surviving atmospheric penetration) would be permitted for a period of five years as a hedge against illegally-deployed ABM's or upgrading SAM systems to effective ABM systems.

Basic Option VI. Reduction of Offensive Forces

In this option, the U.S. would propose that the measures set forth in Option V be followed by a phased reduction in land-based offensive missile launchers and strategic bombers. In order to retain the most effective element of deterrent forces, SLBM's would not be included in this reduction. All other


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


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offensive strategic delivery vehicles (ICBM's, IR/MRBM's, and bombers) would be reduced by about 30%. Reductions would be initiated one year following the effective date for the "freeze," and would be phased over a three-year period.



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DAVID S. BRANDWEIN

Director

Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center

Attachments: a/s

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